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Patient Safety 
Where should patient safety be installed? 
By David M. Sine, DrBE, ARM, CSP, CPHRM, and 
Doug Paull, MD, MS 
The structure of an organization is important, and structure has a profound 
influence on the way people work and what gets done.
1
 Where work units and 
individuals in an organization are placed, to whom they report, and with whom 
they are grouped signals power, prestige, and privilege. It also divides 
workers into groups with common interests and motivations. The question is, 
where should patient safety be placed in a health care organization?  Such a 
question can be answered only within a framework of understanding that 
gives a clear definition to patient safety. We define safety, as do safety 
professionals from other industries, as the reduction of risk. This definition is 
also in concert with the risk management model that identifies claims 
management, risk financing, and loss control as its foundational triad.
2
 
BACKGROUND 
It should not come as a surprise to the reader that no “perfect” model for safety organizations exists in 
health care or elsewhere. Noticeably missing from the patient safety literature are models to guide studies to 
empirically examine system design in relation to patient safety and medical errors. The model described by 
Reason,
3
 often referred to as the “Swiss cheese” model, is probably the most well-known system model used 
within the patient safety community.
4
 Another framework familiar to the reader should be Donabedian’s 
quality framework of structure, process, and outcomes measurement in which structure includes the 
organizational structure. Yet even these two models do little to expand upon Petersen’s initial 
recommendations regarding organization, and neither expresses a preference for a reporting structure in a 
health care setting.
5
 While the Institute of Medicine (IOM) has stated that it considers patient safety 
“indistinguishable from the delivery of quality health care,” it remains relatively mute on the more vexing 
challenge of where it (or quality) should be placed organizationally.
6
 Therefore, to answer the question of 
where to place patient safety organizationally, we turned to models for safety employed in other high-
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reliability organizations (HROs) such as the aviation, transportation, chemical processing, and food production 
industries.  
MODELS FROM OTHER 
INDUSTRIES 
In discussion of where the safety function is best placed, Petersen7 
and others recommend that: Safety report directly to a leader with 
influence. 
Safety has a direct channel to the top of the organization. 
Safety has the ability to influence activities across the entire 
organization. 
A survey conducted by Andersen Consulting
7
 of 7 leading non–health care organizations found that all 7 
had safety programs led by a VP of Safety, and the position was of sufficient organizational stature to 
participate in strategic planning and operations management. The International Encyclopedia of Ergonomics 
and Human Factors, a common desk reference among safety professionals, notes that most companies and 
large governmental research and development organizations have a corporate or executive safety office that 
reports to the organization director.
8
 
RELATIONSHIP TO QUALITY AND 
COMPLIANCE  
The concept of quality in health care and its relationship to patient safety has become a source of 
confusion. In practice, quality usually means adherence to evidence-based guidelines.
9
 We observed that the 
studied non–health care models took effort to clarify the different roles of quality and safety. Most notable 
were safety models from the food industry that equated safety functions with risk reduction and quality with 
compliance to known standards. Safety was found to be the reduction of relative risk levels of illness or death 
and not the relationship of an outcome to a mean or expected outcome. This is not dissimilar to the 
description by the Institute of Medicine’s (IOM) of safe care as “avoiding injuries to patients” found in the 2001 
Crossing the Quality Chasm report. Our conclusion was that patient safety has a near-term focus that uses a 
systems approach to limit the risk of patient harm due to substandard performance. Quality takes the long 
view in seeking both compliance and overall improvement in patient-relevant outcomes and process measures 
that are expressions of standards. Quality management is thus linked to scientific evidence related to clinical 
interventions and programs through measurement.  
Neither did we find support for the notion that quality is either an assurance of safety or that safety is a 
component that falls under an overarching quality umbrella. A study by the Conference Board found that 
Baxter International, upon recognizing that their organization-wide compliance and quality improvement focus 
did not ensure safety, moved the safety program into a channel that reported directly to top management. 
The Baxter experience demonstrates that safety cannot be assumed to be a product of even a robust of quality 
improvement effort. In fact, perfectly functioning, reliable, and fully compliant independent operational 
system elements, when combined, can still produce poor and sometimes even unsafe outcomes. In the 
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complex sociotechnical systems of health care, accidents often result from integration of perfectly functioning 
systems where “operators tend to be inheritors of system defects created by poor design, incorrect 
installation, faulty maintenance, and bad management decisions.
10,11
 
 Even the best compliance and quality improvement program is no guarantee of safety. The literature 
and press are rife with examples of health care organizations that were in full compliance with national quality 
standards (and often accredited by the Joint Commission) and simultaneously engaged in unsafe acts—all too 
often with multiple patients and over a span of time. Traditional approaches to quality often rely on the 
Donabedian model, which examines structures, processes, and outcomes of clinical care. In this model, poor 
quality is presumed to be the result of not following the correct means of performing a task to reach a 
measurable production goal. However, this model is limited in its recognition of the interactions of and 
interdependencies among system components.   
In addition, in a study of hospital work process failures, Tucker and Edmonson found that rather than 
process improvements, the failures elicited workarounds by nurses 93% of the time. Furthermore, reporting 
the failure to someone who might be able to do something about it occurred only 7% of the time. Patient 
safety places a much greater emphasis on the system in which care is provided and less on individual 
performance, and thus encourages improvements to systems through hazard elimination and forcing functions 
rather than workarounds.
1,3
 
POTENTIAL CONFLICTS WITH 
MISSION AND GOALS  
High-level organizational placement of safety is necessary because safety goals may be in conflict with 
production goals—for example, in the marine transportation industry (eg, tonnage delivered). Clearly, during 
inclement weather, ship direction should be altered and speed checked to preserve safety of crew and cargo. 
Similarly, the overtly stated mission of rapid, reliable EMS response (ie, less than a 7-minute arrival time) may 
be in conflict with safety during night operations. Obviously, there are times when safety absolutely trumps 
mission or operational goals such as the absolute prohibition by the California Highway Patrol on night pursuits 
by motorcycle officers. In health care, this direct, high-level reporting relationship of safety to the C suite is 
necessary because, unlike other attributes of an ideal health care system identified by the Institute of 
Medicine (safe, effective, timely, efficient, equitable, and patient centered),[AU: Please insert previously cited 
reference number here or add new reference and renumber remaining references. In other words, this 
should be 6 now based on refs list at end of article, correct?] only being too safe (risk adverse) can be in 
direct conflict with operational goals assuming that one can rarely be too equitable, too effective, or too 
patient centered.  
WHO DIRECTS THE SAFETY 
PROGRAM IS IMPORTANT, TOO 
Non–health care organizations have been quicker to recognize the advantage of recruiting and hiring 
credentialed, degreed safety professionals. In the late 1970s Alcoa, under the leadership of Paul O’Neill, began 
hiring degreed safety professionals to give safety a stronger voice. [AU: Please insert previously cited 
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reference number here or add new reference and renumber remaining references. In other words, this 
should be 1 now based on refs list at end of article, correct?] In health care, however, safety is often a 
“tacked-on” responsibility or the result of a departure from a career trajectory in health care quality. There is a 
belief in health care that a clinical credential is an absolute necessity in technical but non–patient care 
professions such as risk management or safety, and health care organizations have generally failed to 
effectively recruit from the safety profession, often choosing instead to divert or recycle nurses trained and 
experienced in quality. Fully 90% of the employment opportunities posted on the American Society of 
Healthcare Risk Management (ASHRM) website require the applicant to possess an RN degree, yet a significant 
number of the past 14 presidents of that organization did not have a clinical credential. In most non–health 
care industries, safety is recognized as a degreed and credentialed profession unto itself requiring no further 
credential.  
While the nonclinician safety professional may not have the same clinical know-how as “sharp end” 
personnel, they certainly should and must have the authority to involve those with clinical expertise in needed 
safety improvements.
12
 Thus, a new role for health care safety that is modeled after other HRO industries is 
envisioned, placing a high value on understanding system complexity and focusing on component 
interdependencies … not just standards compliance.
13
 This “big picture” characteristic is echoed when the 
term competent person is used in many Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) standards and 
documents such as 29 CFR 1926.32(f) to describe a person who is “capable of identifying existing and 
predictable hazards in the surroundings or working conditions which are unsanitary, hazardous, or dangerous 
to employees, and who has authorization to take prompt corrective measures to eliminate them.”
14
 By way of 
training and/or experience, a competent person is knowledgeable of applicable standards, is capable of 
identifying workplace hazards relating to the specific operation, and has the authority to correct them.   
There is recognition in health care that organizational, managerial, and human factors rather than 
purely technical failures and noncompliance are the prime causes of incidents. While there has been a greater 
emphasis placed on probing leading safety indicators such as attitude, culture, and safety climate, this has yet 
to produce a corresponding shift in health care safety focus from compliance and an organizational placement 
that ensures direct access for safety to top management as it has in other high-reliability organizations. There 
is and should be an overlap between quality and safety, as both endeavor to narrow the range of clinical 
outcomes by raising the overall quality and safety of care. However, safety accomplishes this by addressing the 
physical environment (including attitudinal states such as alertness, fatigue, and motivation), organizational 
culture and climate, error reporting and analysis, and work design as elements of the work system writ large to 
identify and “trap” active and latent errors. The core tools of the safety profession, with its emphasis on 
human factors engineering, forcing functions, team situational awareness, Healthcare Failure Mode and Effect 
Analysis (HFMEA) and root cause analysis are best targeted at the rare outliers in need of major improvements 
than the Six Sigma, reliability, LEAN, ISO9000, and compliance tools directed by quality at the middle of the 
normal distribution. And while the nonclinician safety professional may not have the same clinical know-how 
as other “sharp end” personnel, they certainly have the corporate authority to involve those with clinical 
expertise in needed change efforts. Thus, a new role for health care leaders and managers is envisioned, 
placing a high value on understanding system complexity and focusing on the interdependencies … not just the 
components.
13
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CONCLUSIONS 
We found support in the literature for an amalgam of the proposed 
organizational schemes: Safety should report to a leader with 
influence.  
Safety should have a direct channel to the top of the organization. 
Safety should be led by a VP of safety or a title with sufficient 
stature to participate in strategic planning and operations 
management. 
Even the best compliance and quality programs are no guarantee of 
safety (make safety its own executive office). 
Failure must be reported to someone who can do something to 
correct the problem. 
Safety may find itself in conflict with production goals. 
Where should safety be installed? Petersen’s assertion that safety should report directly to a leader 
with influence at the top of the organization and have the ability to influence activities across the entire 
organization rings true. But also consider what safety credentials, abilities, and previous experience that 
person should have no matter where they are placed organizationally.     
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